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ABSTRACT 
The tenants of University Heights, a 350-unit mixed-
income, housing development in Providence, Rhode Island, 
organized in response to the prepayment of Section 221 (d) (3) 
mortgages on some 48 units, causing the displacement of 35 
families. Their overwhelming success was analyzed in terms of 
its applicability to several frameworks provided by studies of 
community organization and public participation. This study 
has identified and explored two key elements of a successful 
tenant organization--leadership and cohesion. 
Chapter One sets forth the goals and objectives of the 
study, which mainly include determining the significance of 
these elements as part of the organization's formula for 
success. 
Chapters Two and Three provide the background for both 
University Heights and the tenant organization, while Chapters 
Four and Five apply the two elements two frameworks provided 
by Wireman's seven conditions for "good participation" and 
Edelstein and Wandersman's "tenant functions"--the role 
collectively played by tenants as an organization. 
Chapter Six will summarize the applicability of these 
elements to the above described frameworks and draw some 
general conclusions, provide an overview of lessons learned 
from the tenants of University Heights, and identify some of 
the steps that tenants of threatened subsidized rental housing 
might find of interest. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
"We hope our experience will 
other tenant groups facing 
threats we faced to take 
protect their communities" 
encourage 
the same 
action to 
Harry Platt, President 
Association of Tenants of 
University Heights 
Statement of the Issue 
Any discussion of affordable housing in Rhode Island will 
document the sharp rise in home prices and simultaneous 
stagnation of income that has taken place since the 1970s 
(RIHMFC, 1990) . This phenomenon has been accompanied by the 
voting record of the U.S. Congress throughout the 1980s, which 
voted to double military spending while cutting funds for low-
income housing by 82 percent (Jobs With Peace Campaign, 1990) . 
What is equally astounding, however, is the number of 
nonprofit development activities that have filled the gap left 
by the federal government's retreat from housing assistance 
programs. During this period, the number of community-based 
organizations, especially in the economically depressed 
Northeast, has increased tenfold. "According to a National 
Congress for Community Economic Development survey published 
in March, 1989, there are now 1,500 to 2,000 such 
organizations that have completed at least one housing, 
commercial industrial, or business enterprise development 
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project--and 35 percent are in New England states, New York, 
and Pennsylvania" (New England Real Estate Magazine, 1989). 
Some, but not many of these CBOs have responded to one of 
the more troubling dimensions of the nation's housing crisis: 
the imminent threat to the nation's 1.9 million privately-
owned, federally-assisted, low income rental units under the 
Section 8, Section 23 6 and Section 221 ( d) ( 3) programs (Chung, 
1988). Many of these units were constructed or rehabilitated 
with subsidized loans provided by the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) under the condition that, after 20 
years, the owner of the development may prepay the mortgage 
and convert the uni ts within it to market-rate apartments. As 
these terms approach expiration--between 470,000 and 577,000 
units by 1996 nationwide--the present housing crisis will only 
worsen (Chung, 1988) . 
As it is now apparent that CBOs are taking on a central 
role in the provision of affordable housing, it seems possible 
that these two trends; the threat to the nation's rental 
housing stock and the large-scale emergence of CBOs; can be 
fused together. If CBOs were formed to organize tenants of 
threatened subsidized housing, two very desirable outcomes 
could result; first, the alleviation of the nation's 
affordable housing crisis and second, the empowerment of 
lower-income tenants of privately-owned subsidized units. 
Although not much evidence proves that this alternative has 
become widespread, there are several indications that tenant 
2 
organization and empowerment through ownership are possible. 
First, the emergence of the "Kennedy Bill" or the "Low 
Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act of 
1990" has provided for assumption of ownership by tenants with 
a legal basis. The Act provides "tenant organizations, 
nonprofit sponsors, and public agencies with preemptive 
purchase rights with respect to any property offered for 
voluntary or mandatory sale" (Edson, 1990) . In other words, 
if the owner of a housing development wants to sell for the 
purpose of either condominium conversion or upgrading to 
market rate, according to the Kennedy Bill, either the 
tenants, a nonprofit sponsor, or public agency will have the 
right to buy the development before it is offered for sale to 
a developer. 
Secondly, tenant ownership of a rental development has 
become reality recently in Providence, Rhode Island, where 
University Heights, a 349-unit mixed income development 
constructed under the Urban Renewal program of the mid-1960s, 
was purchased by the Association of Tenants of University 
Heights (ATUH), a CBO which formed in response to the 
displacement of some 35 lower income tenants after the 
prepayment of mortgages on their apartments. 
Finally, a combination of other factors indicate that 
tenants can, in fact, respond effectively if their tenure in 
a subsidized housing development is threatened. These include 
the initiation of a lawsuit such as that instituted by ATUH 
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against the development's former owners, based on an alleged 
violation of Title VI I I of the Fair Housing Act of 1968. 
Although the lawsuit was not carried out, it indicates that 
tenant organizations have a number of alternatives in 
defending themselves from eviction. 
In addition, ATUH's efforts are already being simulated 
by tenant groups in other New England communities, although 
their efforts have not yet reached fruition (Milito, 1991). 
Another factor is the recognition of tenant ownership as 
an alternative at the state level, and its subsequent 
inclusion as a policy option by the Rhode Island Housing and 
Mortgage Finance Corporation (RIHMFC), also referred to as 
Rhode Island Housing. Rhode Island Housing is a public 
corporation that provides financial and program support in the 
development and preservation of affordable housing 
opportunities for low and moderate income groups (RIHMFC, 
1990). The Corporation has acknowledged Rhode Island's share 
of the crisis--approximately 17,453 units at risk statewide--
and has addressed it in a recent report. 
Significance of the Study 
This study will determine the feasibility of a more 
widespread application of ATUH's successful methods at the 
state level. In light of the previously-discussed crisis 
facing the nation's subsidized housing stock, the success 
story of ATUH is certainly worthy of analysis because, if 
4 
simulated elsewhere, it could serve as a model of tenant 
empowerment and the mitigation of at least one dimension of 
affordable housing problems. The analysis contained herein 
is, therefore, may serve as a practical guide for tenant 
organizations faced with challenges similar to those faced by 
the Association of Tenants of University Heights. 
Objectives and Organization of the Study 
This analysis has been divided into two major sections--
tenant leadership and tenant cohesion--each discussing the 
conditions that have been identified as major elements of a 
successful tenant organization. Prior to this, a background 
will be provided for both University Heights and the 
subsidized rental housing crisis at large. These two element 
merits consideration in the establishment and development of 
a successful CBO and their analysis is intended to serve as 
both an example of, as well as a guide to, the formation of a 
CBO with the purpose of acquiring funding and purchasing their 
places of residence from their landlords. 
University Heights is unique for a number of reasons; it 
was made possible by the largest mortgage ever approved by 
Rhode Island Housing, and is the first nonprofit housing 
development in Rhode Island that was purchased by its tenants; 
it provides an excellent example of what conditions make 
tenant empowerment an attainable goal. 
The following objectives serve as a framework around 
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wh±ch this study has been constructed. All analysis contained 
herein has been structured around them and has been carried 
out to achieve their fulfillment. They are: 
1. The identification of the major elements behind the 
successful formation of a tenant organization (or 
community-based organization) who have won the right to 
home ownership and the priveledges that come with it. 
2. The utilization of identified elements (i.e. leadership 
and cohesion) as variables by which to evaluate the 
emergence, development, and eventual success of ATUH. 
3. The drawing of conclusions as to what lessons can be 
learned from ATUH's success and how this success can be 
simulated in other identified developments throughout 
Rhode Island. 
4. The identification of steps useful to potential tenant 
organizations based on analysis of elements and 
subsequent conclusions. 
Since the number of nonprofit housing organizations have 
proliferated, they are obviously viewed as an effective tool 
in softening the blow, to a certain extent, of the economic 
downturn and housing crisis faced by the nation and, 
particularly, by New England. The challenges faced by these 
entities can therefore be identified and evaluated by an 
analysis of the conditions necessary for their success. 
Their applicability to University Heights varies, but 
these elements will be assumed to be variables by which 
University Heights and its success will be compared. Each 
will be explored comprehensively to determine its place in a 
. general hierarchy of importance in the context of University 
Heights. 
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The E1ements: An Overview 
Strong Leadership 
This element is essential because it is the leadership 
behind a tenant movement that usually initiates it. In 
addition, consistent leadership has been distinguished because 
it is consistency which distinguishes a tenant group with 
direction and an agenda from a tenant group devoid of 
accomplishment. This is particularly so of the leadership 
provided by Mr. Harry Platt, the President of ATUH. Aspects 
of tenant organization will therefore be discussed, 
particularly as they relate to the success of the ATUH. 
Tenant or Neighborhood Cohesion 
Neighborhood cohesion in the context of affordable 
housing development refers to the level of support provided by 
the community in which the development will take place. In 
the context of tenant acquisition of housing, however, 
neighborhood cohesion refers to the degree of unity a tenant 
group can reach in the attainment of their mutual goal: social 
ownership. "Social ownership refers to the operation of 
housing solely for resident benefit, subject to resident 
control, with resale for profit prohibited. Under social 
ownership, the rights of use ordinarily associated with home 
ownership will be secured and enhanced: security of tenure, 
privacy, and the right to modify one's living space" 
(Institute for Policy Studies Working Group on Housing, 1989). 
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As will be discussed in the analysis of University 
Heights, tenant cohesion may not be a strong factor in a CBO's 
success in purchasing their development. 
neighborhood's part is, however, a 
Participation on the 
major element to be 
considered because at least some degree of tenant support is 
necessary. Exactly how much support needed will be the focus 
of the Tenant or Neighborhood Cohesion chapter. 
Methodology 
This study will differ from a traditional thesis in that 
its methodology will not consist of the proving or disproving 
of a hypothesis. It will examine relevant studies, especially 
Edelstein and Wandersman's study of community mobilization as 
a reaction to toxic contamination and Wireman's study of 
neighborhood leadership. These studies have provided the 
framework for the analysis of tenant cohesion and leadership. 
Each were discussed in the general sense and then as they 
applied to the formation of ATUH. Where the points made by 
these studies paralleled the events that took place at 
University Heights, their conformance was noted and expanded 
upon. When the findings of these studies conflicted with the 
case study, the contrasts were noted. 
Chapter Six will contain the summary of findings, 
conclusions and recommendations to tenants of potentially 
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threatened rental housing developments. The methodology of 
I 
I 
this study will therefore conclude by providing the 
conclusions and recommendations that will satisfy the goals 
indicated earlier. 
It is important to note that this study will contain no 
empirical analysis; only the compilation and analysis of 
relevant historical, demo9raphic and other aspects of tenant 
assumption of ownwership. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
What is most noteworthy about University Height's origins 
is the fact that it is the fulfillment of the promise that 
Irving Jay Fain, a Providence businessman and proponent of 
fair housing, made to the residents of the area over three 
decades ago. Fain transformed Lippitt Hill, a largely 
minority-populated "slum blighted area" into University 
Heights, "the first urban renewal project in the United States 
where housing financed under two separate FHA programs will be 
interspersed within two groups, or 'clusters' of apartment 
structures" serving as "a demonstration to Providence and 
America that people of many backgrounds can live together" 
(Fawcett, 1964). 
Because Lippitt Hill was completely cleared and replaced 
as a neighborhood by University Heights, the following 
historical overview will span back only three decades. Any 
data pertaining to previous events within the study area are 
irrelevant. 
In addition to the origins of University Heights, this 
chapter will also trace the origins of ATUH and discuss its 
development and eventual success as a tenant organization. 
What is especially significant is the full circle that 
has taken place in the development's purpose. The original 
goals of Irving Jay Fain; the retention of a racially and 
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economically mixed group of residents in the neighborhood, 
were threatened by prepayment when some units became eligible 
in the mid-1980s. The actions of ATUH brought University 
Heights' true purpose back to its tenants. As ATUH President 
Harry Platt stated: "We [will] all go on paying rent like we 
used to. There will not be any condominiums ... and there are 
150 [low income units] like there were when Irving Fain built 
University Heights, and it's going to stay that way--
economically and racially integrated. We want it that way. 
It's been good for us, we've all learned and benefitted from 
the experience, and we want it to continue indefinitely" 
(Dykas, 1990). 
The Origins of University Heights 
Construction began on October 8, 1964 on the project, at 
a total of cost of $7.5 million. The 32-acre "Lippitt Hill 
redevelopment area" would eventually contain 349 housing units 
and a commercial development (Fawcett, 1964). The overall 
development was to be built in two phases, with an initial 
phase of 146 units completed by 1965, and the second phase 
consisting of the commercial center and additional units 
completed by 1967 (Fawcett, 1962). The eventual development 
would cover approximately 15 acres consisting of 22 low-rise 
buildings. 
Prior to this, the Providence Redevelopment Agency (PRA) 
had determined that "90 percent of the dwelling units in the 
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area were found to have at least one basic deficiency in 
essential dwelling facilities, 30 percent had two or more such 
basic deficiencies, while 15 percent had three or more" (PRA, 
1958) . Because of such deficiencies as "serious 
deterioration, serious overcrowding, lack of sanitary 
facilities, and serious inadequacies in lighting and 
ventilation" (PRA, 1958) , a large proportion of housing uni ts 
in the neighborhood were condemned under the federal urban 
renewal program. Homes were subsequently cleared and their 
residents relocated. 
"Various forms of local assistance were provided to Fain 
and his partners in the development's construction, including 
subsidized mortgages and mortgage insurance under the Section 
221 (d) (3) and Section 220 programs of the National Housing 
Act" (Milito, 1990) . 
The project was, therefore, built in two phases, with 
each of these in turn divided into two "sub-developments". 
Both were completed by 1968. Each phase involved the 
construction of some units being built under the provisions of 
the Section 221 (d) (3) mortgage and some with the Section 220. 
The units built with the Section 221 (d) (3) mortgage would be 
set aside for lower income tenants, while the remaining units 
built with the Section 220 mortgage were rented to moderate 
and market income tenants (Milito, 1990) It was this 
combination of mortgages that made the mixed income of 
residents possible. 
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Irving Fain's goal was successfully attained and 
University Heights remained an intact racially mi xed 
neighborhood for many years after Fain's death in 1970. 
However, several occurrences in the mid-1980s caused 
significant changes at University Heights. A dramatic 
increase in real estate values began, causing home prices to 
increase approximately 25 percent per year, "resulting in 
significant increases for tenants across the board" (Milito, 
1990). In addition, affordable rental units were further 
pressured by the expansion of the condominium market and 
subsequent conversion of many rental complexes into 
condominiums. 
Additionally, Irving Fain's heirs decided to sell the 
development in 1985, simultaneous to the 20-year "option-to-
sell" milestone of the first phase of the development. Upon 
assuming ownership, the new owners, University Heights 
Associates (UHA), proceeded to prepay the Section 221 (d) (3) 
mortgage which covered 48 of the 150 units that comprised the 
first phase of the development (Milito, 1990) . As a result, 
about 35 families were displaced, according to ATUH President 
Harry Platt. "'And there was no limit to how much the rent 
could be increased' Platt said. Some of us started to worry 
that a wonderful way of life that we'd never known before, a 
way that led us into friendships, and relationships beyond our 
experience, was slipping away'" (Dykas, 1990). In addition, 
UHA announced that it would soon prepay the remaining Section 
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221 (d) (3) mortgages, which covered the remaining 102 
affordable units, as soon as possible. 
The Emergence of ATUH 
"In response to this threat to our community, a group of 
tenants formed the Association of Tenants of University 
Heights," recalls Platt. "The board members of ATUH were a 
group of ordinary tenants with no particular real estate 
background or expertise. The group was a cross-section of the 
University Heights community and included a salesman, a 
printer, broadcaster, several clerical workers, and a few 
retired persons. But our lack of real estate expertise was 
matched by our desire to preserve our community and our 
willingness to work together to reach that goal" (Platt) . 
Although many of these tenants resided in market rate 
apartments and were largely unaffected by the prepayments, 
they were outraged that their community's stability had been 
eroded by the new owners and their apparent goal of 
transforming the entire development into market rate 
apartments. 
The core group that would eventually form ATUH's board of 
directors had begun meeting regularly by this time and had 
begun soliciting support from the tenants-at-large. Tenant 
association fees of $10 were collected and the board members 
began to formulate strategies to prevent the prepayment of the 
mortgages on the second phase units. The Association's long-
14 
term goal, however, was the preservation of University 
Heights' community. 
The Need for Technical Assistance is Recognized 
Platt, as a salesman, had formidable e xperience in 
negotiation and was supported by an ever-growing and 
determined group. Even he realized, however, that the skills 
needed to bring their goals into fruition did not e x ist among 
them . Outside expertise was needed to translate their 
determination into an effective coalition. This, he reasoned, 
could only be accomplished by a united and cohesive tenant 
organization. Despite the impressive group assembled, 
experience in maximizing tenant support was needed. It was 
then that ATUH made contact with Asata Tigrai of Project 
Basic, a tenant organizing group that was instrumental in 
e xpanding ATUH's support base. 
Tigrai was able to Provide advice and assistance to ATUH, 
guiding them in the publication and distribution of leaflets 
and coordinating of tenant meetings. When ATUH's first at-
large meeting brought 35 people--a 10 percent turnout--Platt 
was disappointed. "This kind of turnout was encouraging," 
Platt was told by Tigrai. A large and cohesive show of unity 
took time, and a 10 percent was more than adequate for a first 
attempt (Platt, 1991). 
15 
Lega1 Assistance 
In 1986, ATUH, at Tigrai' s urging, made contact with 
Rhode Island Legal Services (RILS) and were accepted as a 
client. ATUH had begun pursuing their goal by another angle--
the legality of prepayment if lower income or minority groups 
are affected. With the assistance of Michael Milito of RILS, 
the Association had filed a federal court lawsuit challenging 
the proposed prepayment of the phase two mortgage, primarily 
on the grounds that prepayment would cause injury to those 
subsequently displaced and was in violation of the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968. As a result, ATUH was successful in 
postponing the scheduled prepayment in June 1987 until after 
the case could be heard. 
During this time, UHA had decided to sell University 
Heights and were in the process of seeking out prospective 
buyers while the lawsuit was pending. Their efforts to find 
a buyer were hampered, however, because of the lawsuit. 
ATUH's case against UHA had such an influence on prospective 
buyers that the buyers themselves were approaching ATUH to 
discuss "terms under which ATUH would be willing to dismiss 
the lawsuit" (Milito, 1990) 
Although ATUH had initially focused its attention on 
preventing the prepayment of the second phase Section 221 
mortgage, they found that they could not come to any agreement 
with any prospective buyers on the affected 102 units. It 
became apparent to ATUH that the only way to ensure the 
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achievement of their long-term goal was the purchase of the 
development themselves. They therefore decided to make an 
offer. It was at this point that another dimension of 
technical support was needed--real estate and development 
expertise. 
Conununity Builders 
By 1987, ATUH had recognized that they were greatly in 
need of assistance in putting together a workable financial 
plan to acquire University Heights. They faced significant 
constraints, however, in that they had limited funds and could 
not afford the services of a development consultant. 
This changed, however, when ATUH made contact with The 
Community Builders, a non-profit real estate development 
consultant specializing in the provision of real estate 
technical assistance to community-based organizations. During 
this time, Milito was hired by The Community Builders as 
Project Developer for this and other developments in the 
region. The Community Builders worked with ATUH under the 
agreement that the Association would repay fees upon their 
acquisition of University Heights. With their services 
secured, ATUH began the formulation of a proposal and the 
development of a financing plan for the development's 
acqusition. By November of 1987, the Association was able to 
enter into a Purchase and Sale Agreement with UHA for the 
acquisition of University Heights (Milito, 1990). 
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Financing P1ans are Initiated 
During the next two years, ATUH endured the arduous task 
of obtaining and compiling the necesary approvals from HUD and 
coordinating the complex links that made up the project's 
financing plan. Two components were particularly difficult to 
coordinate: the Approval for a Plan of Action and the 
Application for a Transfer of Physical Assets (TPA) . 
The Plan of Action was difficult largely because of HUD's 
inexperience with at-risk developments. As result, recalls 
Michael Milito, "the process was far from streamlined" 
(Milito, 1990) and the HUD central office changed policies 
governing income eligibility a number of times during this 
period. For example, there were no clear guidelines set for 
Section 8 subsidies to tenants earning between 50 and 80 
percent of the area median. 
"The TPA also presented problems", recalls Milito. "ATUH 
was originally advised not to submit an application for TPA 
until a decision had been reached on its Plan of Action, on 
the theory that ATUH would not be able to identify its 
financing plan in the TPA until it knew what HUD's 
participation would be. This proved to be bad advice as ATUH 
subsequently was told that the Plan of Action could not be 
approved until the TPA was approved first. The bottom line is 
that it took HUD nearly 15 months to approve ATUH's Plan of 
Action" (Milito, 1990). 
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State and Local Government Involvement Begins 
While ATUH's financing plans were being formulated with 
HUD, Harry Platt began approaching state and local leaders. 
"It was a working plan, good enough to go to the owners with," 
recalls Platt "but we needed a deposit to get a six-month 
period to show what we could do, to show that we could pull it 
off, raise the money" (Dykas, 1990). 
The Community Builders persuaded Mayor Joseph Paolino of 
Providence to give ATUH $50,000 as a deposit to UHA, who were 
in turn persuaded to extend their sale deadline from six 
months to 18 months. 
Among the other government agencies approached by ATUH 
were Rhode Island Housing, The Governor's Office of Housing, 
Energy and Intergovernmental Relations (GOHEIR), and the 
Providence Housing Authority (PHA) . "At first they laughed at 
us, sort of, but they listened, and slowly it began to 
happen," said Platt of ATUH' s efforts to obtain financing 
commitments. "Along the way, Mayor Paolino kicked in another 
$1 million 'to show city interest in the project' and Rhode 
Island Housing added another $750,000 from its targeted loan 
fund, and finally, in March, it all came together, RIHMFC 
approved the project--$22.5 million--and on October 17, 1990 
it happened, the sale was consumated" (Dykas, 
the largest mortgage ever supplied by RIH, 
1990) Thus 
combined with 
assistance from The Community Builders, Project Basic, RILS, 
GOHEIR, HUD, and the City of Providence, at last made ATUH the 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SUBSIDIZED RENTAL HOUSING IN RHODE ISLAND 
With the series of events undergone by ATUH in mind, it 
is important to remember that those units affected by 
prepayment at University Heights makes up less than two 
percent of at-risk subsidized units in Rhode Island. This 
chapter will put University Heights and the efforts of ATUH 
into context by providing an overview of the state's 
subsidized rental units and the significance of the threat 
they face. 
The programs relevant to the state's rental housing stock 
will be reviewed, namely those under Section 221 (d) (3), 
Section 236, and Section 8 jurisdiction. In addition, an 
inventory of those rental units actually in jeopardy will be 
provided. This inventory will include those units among the 
above programs considered "very likely to prepay" and "likely 
to prepay" as categorized by Rhode Island Housing (RIHMFC, 
1988) . 
Section 221 (d) (3) 
Section 221 (d) (3) was originally created to assist 
rental housing affordability and production. Under this 
program, HUD was to pay a portion of mortgage interest 
payments to allow owners to reduce the amount of rent charged 
to tenants. In addition, HUD was allowed to provide below-
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owners of University Heights. 
Ownership of University Heights 
The development is now "owned by the ... Association, a 
nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of the State of 
Rhode Island. ATUH has been determined to be exempt from 
federal taxation under Section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code" (Milito, 1990) . It is a membership-based 
corporation in which all persons residing within the 
development are able to join, with annual membership dues set 
at $10 per unit. As of April 11, 1990, the board consists of 
12 members. Only members of the Association are eligible to 
become directors, and directors are elected at annual meetings 
of the Corporation in the March of each year (Milito, 1990) . 
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market interest rates to owners in return for an agreement to 
set aside a number of units for low-income tenants (Chung, 
1988). 
"This program was criticized", according to Chung," 
because HUD could only lower the interest rate to one percent. 
Thus, the lowest income groups were priced out of the market. 
In addition, the program was not popular with the federal 
government because the entire amount to be loaned was included 
in the yearly budget" and caused considerable complications. 
As a result, the Section 236 subsidy program of the Housing 
Act of 1968 was created to supersede this program (Chung, 
1988). 
Section 236 
Like Section 221, the interest rate charged on a Section 
236 project can be as little as one percent. It differs, 
however, in that it pays the subsidy to the project owner 
annually as opposed to buying the mortgage in its entirety at 
the outset. Thus, at its outset in the late 1960s, the 
program was initiated to create incentives for developers to 
construct and manage low and moderate-income housing. In this 
way, "mortgage interest subsidies under a host of programs and 
rent supplements were provided either individually or in 
combination to make it profitable for private intrepreneurs to 
produce decent housing at below-market rents". According to 
Chung's anal ysis: "Overall, in the 1960s federal housing 
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assistance was designed primarily to augment the supply of 
housing available to low and moderate income families" ( 1988) . 
This program was evaluated by the Nixon Administration in 
the early 1970s, and as a result, a moratorium was imposed. 
A subsequent 1973 report revealed that the cost of many units 
subsidized by the program were higher than their actual value. 
In addition, it was found that an insufficiently low number of 
household were being served by the program and that a 
substantial number of projects assisted under the program were 
defaulting on their loans. As a result, the moratorium 
imposed on the program was never lifted. 
The following year, the Housing and Community Development 
Act of 1974 was enacted. This Act redefined the role that the 
federal government would play in housing, urban development 
and many other forms of assistance. It contained a new and 
flexible approach to housing assistance: the Section 8 subsidy 
program. 
Section 8 
This program is comprised of two sub-programs: Existing 
Housing and New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation 
programs. Under the Existing Housing Program, tenant 
eligibility is based on income--those earning less than 80 
percent of the local area median income are eligible. The 
tenant pays 30 percent of his or her income toward rent, and 
the difference between that amount and what is deemed the 
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"fair market rent" is made up by HUD. 
Under the terms of the New Construction / Substantial 
Rehabilitation Program, a 20 to 30-year agreement is made by 
HUD at the time of a development's construction "to pay the 
difference between the full rent of the units developed and a 
fixed share of the tenant's incomes for those units occupied 
by program participants" (Chung, 1988). This program differs 
from the Ex isting Housing Program in two fundamental ways. 
First, the New Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation Program 
spurs the production of new low-income units, while the 
existing housing 
assistance for 
program 
the 
does not. 
tenant 
In addition, 
under the 
rental 
New 
Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation Program is limited to 
the actual constructed unit, while under the existing housing 
program, rental assistance is more flexible and moves with the 
tenant. In other words, income-eligible tenants have choice 
as to where they would like to live and may apply their 
Section 8 contract to any number of rental units. Under the 
first program, however, the subsidy is "anchored" to the 
constructed unit. 
Changes in Housing Po1icy Under the Reagan Administration 
Housing policy underwent additional, more radical, 
alterations during the Reagan years. Between 1981 and 1987, 
the bugget for HUD's subsidized housing program was cut from 
$30.1 billion in fiscal year 1981 to $10.7 billion in fiscal 
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year 1987. This translates to a reduction in the number of 
new units to be covered by HUD funding from 204,000 in 1981 to 
76, 406 in 1987 (Chung, 1988). 
Specifically, such programs as the New Construction I 
Substantial Rehabilitation Program were cut under the Housing 
and Urban Recovery Act of 1983. In addition, the Act 
established an experimental voucher-based program under which 
the amount of rental assistance is determined by the income of 
eligible participants minus the local fair market rent. Like 
the Existing Housing Program, this program does not perpetuate 
new construction. It differs, however, in that tenants are 
free to rent units above the fair market rate. Vouchers have 
five year terms of corrunitment, unlike the original Section 8 
programs, which have five year terms that are extendable to up 
to fifteen years. 
The Housing Voucher program first yielded units in 1985, 
so 1985 and 1986 are made up entirely of voucher-based units. 
Another notable change in housing policy that occurred 
during the Reagan years was an increase in the percentage of 
income that the tenant had to contribute toward rent. This 
proportion increased from 25 percent to 30 percent (Chung, 
1988). Thus, rental housing policy has faced a considerable 
degree of change during this time. None of these changes have 
offered low and moderate-income tenants a better alternative 
or security of tenure. The challenge facing government at 
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all levels is the creation of a balance between the 
contractual rights of rental property owners and the needs of 
low and moderate income tenants. This challenge, however, 
must also be shared by tenants. As it appears unlikely that 
federal government expenditure on subsidized housing will 
increase, tenants must explore their own options in providing 
themselves with security of tenure. The number of affected 
tenants is substantial, as indicated by Rhode Island Housing: 
2,423 units in 19 developments in the "very likely to prepay" 
category and 2, 505 uni ts in 2 6 developments classified as 
"likely to prepay" (RIHMFC, 1988) 
As ATUH President Harry Platt noted, the substantial 
number of tenants affected also has a positive side. If these 
tenants organized, reasons Platt, they could wield substantial 
political power. For example, University Heights comprises a 
significant proportion of District 6 of Providence. According 
to Platt, an average of 300 voters participated in recent 
elections. With 349 units, University Heights could easily 
impact the outcome of any election if it organized and chose 
to do so. 
An inventory of the "very likely" and "likely to prepay" 
will now be provided to identify the scope of the problem on 
the local level. 
Potential Impacts of Prepayment on Rhode Island 
According to Chung, Providence would be hardest hit of 
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all" Rhode Island communities in the event of increased 
mortgage prepayment. For the state, the percentage of renter-
occupied housing units as of 1988 is 41 percent, while the 
proportion in Providence is 56.2 percent (Chung, 1988). 
As estimated by RIHMFC, over 650 units in Rhode Island 
are categorized as either likely or very likely to pay in 1991 
alone. Until 1996, the furthest year projected by Rhode 
Island Housing, several hundred units per year are considered 
in serious jeopardy. 1994 is the peak year, with over one 
thousand units threatened by prepayment. 
This proportion of affected tenants further underscores 
the importance of tenant organization. Provided with the 
example of ATUH, tenants must recognize the significance of 
eminent prepayment on the developments in which they reside 
and act accordingly. The basis for such action, as 
illustrated by the events of University Heights, can best be 
provided by the first of the six elements--strong leadership. 
The following chapter will discuss the leadership style of 
ATUH board members, particularly its president, Harry Platt. 
An overview of their leadership will culminate in the 
identification of what actions can--and must--be replicated in 
order to achieve social ownership. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
STRONG LEADERSHIP 
This chapter will discuss the first element--strong 
leadership. Al though the importance of these elements vary by 
organization, the leadership provided by ATUH was clearly one 
of the primary factors in the Association's success. The 
initiative and determination of Harry Platt and other ATUH 
board members had everything to do with the Association's 
success. 
Leadership in Tenant Organization: Why is it Important ? 
Two primary differences between a CBO formed to build 
affordable housing and one formed in response to the threat of 
prepayment are obvious: the immediacy of the threat and the 
consequences of failure. Although the failure of a CBO with 
the goal of acquiring and dev_eloping affordable housing is 
unfortunate, the failure does not result in the displacement 
of low and moderate-income groups. When faced with mortgage 
prepayment, the tenants of a threatened housing development 
must act quickly and effectively. This is where leadership of 
the tenant organization comes into play. 
In her 1984 publication, Urban Neighborhoods, Networks, 
and Families: New Forms for Old Values, Wireman identifies 
seven general conditions that must exist in fostering the 
development of "good participation". For the purposes of this 
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study, these will also be assumed to be conditions necessary 
for a strong tenant association. What is immediately apparent 
is the fact that these conditions must all stem from one 
source--the leadership provided by an individual or core group 
who lead the tenant organization. These conditions are: 
1. Provision of information on an ongoing basis and 
early in the decision-making process 
2. Availability of trusted technical assistance as an 
aid to understanding complicated or technical 
programs 
3. Regular meetings with decision makers during their 
deliberations 
4. An organization that is perceived by 
officials and neighborhood residents 
representative of the area 
both city 
as being 
5. An acknowledged right to participate and a clear 
commitment by bureaucrats to the process of citizen 
participation 
6. Ability to achieve at least some goals on a fairly 
consistent basis 
7. Sufficient ongoing stable financial support to 
relieve a group from spending most of its energies 
on fund raising, often on a crisis basis. (Wireman, 
1984) . 
These conditions highlight precisely what is expected of 
tenant association leadership and what responsibilities they 
are to assume. Only the fifth condition, commitment on the 
part of bureaucracy, is inapplicable to tenant associations. 
As little can be done by associations to change government 
bureaucracy's perception of them, they must work around this 
c ondition and concentrate on the third condi tion--regular 
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meetings with decision makers--for it is their perception (and 
financial support) that really counts. As a result, this will 
not be discussed. The six th condition, the ability to achieve 
goals on a regular basis, does not have direct parallels 
either. By no means, however, does this indicate that the 
consistent achievement of goals is not essential. In fact, it 
will be argued that incorporating this strategy can be greatly 
beneficial to tenant associations--especially as a tool of 
generating support and boosting morale. This is especially so 
of CBOs in search of capital. 
Application of Wireman's Conditions to the Case Study 
1. Dissemination of Information 
The leader's role as provider of information for a tenant 
association can be described as two-dimensional. Both lines 
of communication within the Association, well as lines to 
outside players (technical supporters, political leaders, 
etc.) must be managed by leaders. 
A. Managing Intra-group Communications 
With regard to the provision of information, leadership 
is the focal point of the communication network that supports 
the CBO. In terms of intra-group or intra-neighborhood 
communication lines, leadership in the form of a board or an 
individual clarifies the CBO's goals and objectives. This is 
mainly so because some form of hierarchy or chain of command 
is necessary in maintaining cohesion in the organization. 
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One of the first lessons that Harry Platt learned in 
initiating an active tenants' assocation was the importance of 
a clear focus and coordination offered by a core group. From 
his association with Asata Tigrai of Project Basic, he learned 
the fundamentals of tenant organization. These fundamentals 
included the generation of support for the achievement of 
ATUH's goals through meetings, the distribution of flyers, and 
gaining 
lending 
acceptance and legitimacy from political leaders, 
institutions, and other potential allies. These 
activities simply cannot be achieved without an agenda and the 
focus provided by leadership. 
B. Managing Communications With Outside Players 
In terms of the CBO's communication lines with outside 
organizations and agencies, again the primary responsibility 
lies with the Association's leaders. As these leaders must 
negotiate and persuade political leaders, lending 
institutions, and public agencies, certain experience, skills, 
or personal attributes are useful. In the case of University 
Heights, this is certainly the case. As Wireman notes: "The 
difference in tactics selected by different [tenant leaders] 
may reflect philosophical positions, but is also related to 
the socio-economic position of the group. Middle-class 
persons who interact regularly with politicians and city 
officials at business meetings or social gatherings or whose 
contributions are politically important do not have to resort 
to sitting in at the mayor's office in order to have their 
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concerns heard" (Wireman, 1984) . No members of ATUH interact 
regularly with politicians, nor are they by any means 
uniformly middle-class. "The members of ATUH are ordinary 
people," asserts Platt, "not financial wizards or developer 
types. We have no Wall Street merger ability, just a 
willingness to work hard and stay 
goal" (Platt, 1990) . In the case 
focused on reaching our 
of University Heights, 
therefore, the mi xed-income nature of the development ensured 
that middle-income residents would be included in ATUH' s 
makeup. This may have been helpful in avoiding the class, 
ethnic, or racial conflicts that have characterized numerous 
negotiations between tenant groups and government in the past 
(Wireman, 1984). 
Examples of these conflicts include rent strikes by the 
East Side Tenants Union (ESTU) , made up primarily of low-
income immigrants, and their dispute with New York City Mayor 
Fiorello LaGuardia; as well as the tenants of Boston's West 
Side and their clash with proponents of Urban Renewal in the 
late 1950s. 
The latter example has particular relevance to University 
Heights. Unfortunately, it exemplifies the wrong approach by 
tenant association leaders and the consequences of poor 
leadership. This tenant's association, as chronicled by 
Herbert Gans in The Urban Villagers was formed by the largely 
Italian-American residents of the neighborhood who were forced 
from their homes by the development of luxury high rise 
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apartments 
leadership 
(Gans, 
among 
1962) . Gans' 
the tenants 
illustration of a lack of 
o f the West End and its 
unfortunate consequences onl y underscore the need for 
established lines of communicati ons. As these lines are best 
formed by leaders and an established hierarchy, tenant groups 
should be aware of these implications. 
2. Availability of Technical Assistance 
The link between a tenant association's leadership and 
the technical assistance provided to the group is every bit as 
vital as the lines of communication that serve them. For 
without some form of representation, working with such 
technical support personnel as lawyers, developers, real 
estate agents, and lenders would be chaotic and ineffective. 
It is therefore necessary that an association consolidate a 
knowledge of its goals and resources in several capable 
individuals who can work one~on-one with technical support 
staff. 
To contrast once again with Gans' case study of Boston's 
West End, ATUH achieved their goals in one sense because of 
indifference on the part of a significant proportion of 
University Heights. This allowed ATUH an autonomy that was 
instrumental in their success. As Gans notes of the 
conditions that must be in place for leadership to be 
effective : 
"The peer group must, above all, give life to the 
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individual, and cooperative action directed toward 
a common end detracts too much from this central 
purpose. Moreover, West Enders are reluctant to 
place themselves in a leader-follower, officer-
member relationship, which would detract from the 
individuating function of the group and would also 
require members to assume a subordinate, if not 
dependent, role towards the leader. Consequently, 
only a highly charismatic leader seems to be able 
to attract followers and retain their loyalty for 
any length of time" (Gans, 1962) . 
This situation is completely converse to the experiences 
of ATUH, who were able to function free of interference from 
other University Heights tenants. This is largely because of 
the fact that not all tenants (less than one third) were to be 
negatively affected by prepayment. As a result, the number of 
"chiefs" was mitigated to a minimum number, one conducive to 
productivity. 
The reigns were, therefore, taken by ATUH without the 
tumult and panic that characterized the West Enders' attempts 
to mobilize. "In fact," wrote Gans, "one of the reasons for 
the inability of the Save the West End Committee to function 
was the desire of most of the participants to be leaders and 
their unwillingness to carry out the routine tasks required. 
The familiar complaint of community organizations everywhere--
'too many Chiefs and no Indians'--is perhaps nowhere more true 
than among people like the West Enders" (Gans, 1962) . 
In short, a conflict for leadership never occurred among 
the tenants of University Heights, nor did it occur 
inclusively among the board members of ATUH. This lack of 
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conflict greatly aided ATUH in its dealings with its technical 
supporters, namely Project Basic, RILS, and The Community 
Builders. 
3. Regular Meetings With Decision Makers 
Many of the principles discussed under the previous 
section also apply to the importance of leadership when 
meeting and negotiating with political leaders. Just as an 
organization's leadership must represent their goals and 
wishes when dealing with technical support staff, so must it 
represent them when the association deals with political 
leaders. "I had been to see [Providence] Mayor Paolino and 
[former Rhode Island] Governor Diprete," recalls Harry Platt, 
"and I tried to interest them in rent controls, but as soon as 
I mentioned that, their eyes would glaze over. So I was 
trying to beef up my arguments with votes represented by 
members of a Tenant's Association" (Dykas, 1990). As a 
result, Platt went through the process of organizing and 
incorporating ATUH. In this way, he was able to assert ATUH's 
position as a political power in the City by reminding local 
politicians of the proportion of voters University Heights 
represented. 
This exemplifies the importance of singular leadership: 
Harry Platt met with Paolino and DiPrete and determined that 
University Heights would have to prove to politicians that a 
failure to respond to the needs of University Heights tenants 
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would somehow bring undesireable repercussions. Large groups 
cannot negotiate effectively with political leaders. Harry 
Platt was able to bring the collective desires of ATUH to 
meetings with the Mayor and Governor, and then make key 
decisions for the group. This further underscores how 
essential representation is in proving unity and legitimacy to 
the federal, state and municipal government. This is 
particularly noteworthy in light of the fact that, "along the 
way, Mayor Paolino kicked in another $1 million 'to show city 
interest in the project'" (Dykas, 1990). 
4. Perception bv Citv Officials and Residents that the 
Organization is Representative of the Area 
Yet another responsibility of tenant association 
leadership is forming a group with goals and policies that 
truly represents the interests of the people who reside there. 
Wireman's condition, therefore, should go beyond calling for 
the "perception" of proper representation and mandate actual 
representation. In the case of ATUH, the board members were 
"an ordinary group of tenants with no particular real estate 
background or expertise. The group was a cross-section of the 
University Heights community and included a salesman, a 
printer, broadcaster, several clerical workers and a few 
retired persons" (Platt, 1990). By forming a group of such 
diverse backgrounds, ATUH was able to prove to political 
leaders, as well as lenders, that the Association did 
represent the interests of all University Heights tenants. As 
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a result, they were able to get what they wanted. Thus, ATUH 
recognized that only by creating an association open to all 
residents were they to be viewed as legitimate in the eyes of 
potential financial supporters. 
E5. Ability to Achieve at least Some Goals on a Fairly 
Consistent Basis 
A tenant association's leadership must, according to 
Wireman, be able to lead the group in the achievement of at 
least some goals on a fairly consistent basis. She reasons, 
rightfully so, that the association would become disheartened 
if their efforts appeared pointless and would give up. The 
leadership must recognize this and plan accordingly. For 
instance, smaller-scale, more manageable objectives should be 
arranged in a timeline that is realistic, yet incorporates 
moderate objectives that are rewarding when achieved. 
No direct parallels, in fact, exist between this 
condition and the case study. However, as discussed earlier, 
the setting of achievable goals can prove invaluable to 
associations with flagging morale and a need to see that their 
efforts are not in vain. If tenants who have not yet joined 
an association see it making strides, they may feel compelled 
to join. This would probobly not be the case if a CBO had 
obscure goals with no immediate prospects of achieving them. 
In sum, leadership must provide a carrot and stick with which 
to move the organization forward. 
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7. Sufficient, Ongoing Financial Support 
The role of leadership again arises in the attainment of 
the final condition--stable financial support. Examples of 
this include small tokens of financial support, such as ATUH's 
collection of a $10 per tenant monthly charge, as well as the 
"landing" of a $22.5 million Rhode Island Housing mortgage. 
In addition, the Association's leadership successfully 
solicited the assistance of Project Basic,RILS, and The 
Community Builders with "special arrangements, as in the case 
of the Community Builders, which entailed a payment scheme 
similar to that of a "pay us only if you win" lawyer. Under 
this arrangement, ATUH was able to retain the services of The 
Community Builders throughout their formation and arranged to 
pay fees due upon acquiring University Heights. 
Conclusions 
This 
conditions 
application of Peggy 
for the development of 
Wireman's prerequisite 
"good participation" has 
been undertaken to highlight the importance of leadership in 
attaining tenant ownership. 
that are entrusted with a 
The many facets of responsibility 
tenant association leader (or 
leaders) have been elaborated upon to provide the foundation 
upon which a CBO can form. 
Such responsibilities as the desemination of information, 
frequent contact with technical support staff, negotiations 
with political leaders, inclusion of a cross-section of 
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tenants, the consistent achievement of goals, and sufficient 
management of fundraising activities are all part of the 
frustrating yet rewarding aspects of being a tenant 
organization leader. As was illustrated in the ill-fated 
organization of Boston's West End residents described in The 
Urban Villagers , a lack of leadership produces the inevitable 
undesireable results. The example provided by Harry Platt, 
Marge Day and Bessie Jones and other ATUH board members is one 
of a favorable outcome based on their "drive, determination 
and organization" (Platt, 1990). 
Equally important to leadership is the degree of cohesion 
achieved by an organization. The following chapter will 
discuss this issue. 
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CHAPTER FXVE 
TENANT COHESION 
Like leadership, the d~gree of cohesion demonstrated by 
a tenant organization is characterized by two primary factors; 
first, both form the basis of the organization's success; and 
second, they are the only two factors that are directly 
influenced and controlled by the tenants themselves. 
With regard to the first factor as it applies to 
University Heights, there is some evidence of a strong 
relationship between tenant cohesion and the tenant 
organization's success. This is largely because there would 
be no point 
some degree 
in efforts to purchase the development without 
of unity displayed by its tenants. Secondly, 
tenant cohesion and leadership, unlike technical support, 
financing, and government commitment, must be fostered within 
the resident population of the development. While ATUH 
obviously had a strong voice in the type or degree of 
technical support supplied to them, cohesion and leadership 
must be inherent in the tenants' collective character. 
This chapter will provide an overview and analysis of 
cohesion as it influenced--and continues to influence-~the 
dynamics of tenant empowerment as displayed by ATUH. It will 
be divided into three parts, each of which cover some of the 
fundamental dimensions of tenant cohesion. 
The first part will describe centripetal forces that 
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determine the degree of cohesion ultimately achieved by a 
tenant group. They include conditions identified by Edelstein 
and Wandersman (1987) in their framework as sparking cohesion, 
which will be presented to outline some circumstances that 
facilitate t e nant cohesion. This framework will describe how 
external threats galvanize tenant or community relations . 
This will be contrasted to an example of tenant cohesion 
without immediate threat to illustrate that tenant 
organization need not be sparked by encroachment from outside 
forces (i.e. prepayment) This case study will describe the 
efforts of tenants in Monkwick, Colchester, a British 
government-owned housing development, highlighting their 
successful organization and acquisition endeavors. 
Incorporating the first two factors, the third part will 
examine the essential collective role that tenants play in 
providing support to the organization's leadership. Whatever 
the causes and characteristics of its formation, a tenant 
organization's main body plays a vital collective role in its 
success. As Wireman's seven criterion served as the 
framework for describing the tasks of tenant leadership, the 
"unwritten" functions assigned to tenants will be analyzed 
using a framework provided by Edelstein and Wandersman in 
their study of Legler, New Jersey residents and their 
collective response to the contamination of their drinking 
water. 
These functions differ from the specified roles of tenant 
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leadership in that they are more broad and undefined. They 
are less tasks or jobs than vague "conditions" that must exist 
in the collective character of a development's tenants. These 
functions, as described by Edelstein and Wandersman, are: 
1. Social Support 
2. Sources of Information 
3. Sources of Power 
Other tenant and neighborhood groups have historically 
faced such varying threats as urban renewal in Boston (Gans, 
1962) and New York City (Davies, 1966) or "neighborhood 
rehabilitation" in Israel (Churchman, 1984), rent increases in 
Berkeley (Clavel, 1986) and New York City (Spencer, 1981), and 
contamination of drinking water, as was described in the 
article that provided the above framework. Each of these 
support Edelstein and Wandersman's findings that the above 
functions have a significant degree of influence on the 
success (or lack thereof) of a tenant organization. 
An overview of these dimensions of tenant cohesion is 
intended to complement the functions of tenant leadership 
described in the previous chapter. Before a discussion of 
tenant cohesion, however, it is important that certain terms 
used in this chapter be clarified. Research for this study 
raised such terms as "community organization", "neighborhood 
organization", "tenant organization", and "public 
participation "--all of which were applicable, to a certain 
extent, to University Heights. It became apparent, however, 
that the situations described by these terms varied greatly in 
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scope. For instance, tenant organization as described by 
Spencer (1981) entailed a complex network of small, fragmented 
tenant groups from throughout New York City; while community 
organization as described by Edelstein and Wandersman referred 
to a concentrated section of a rural area situated above a 
contaminated groundwater aquifer. 
What was necessary in drawing appropriate comparisons 
between such case studies and University Heights was the 
standardization of the above arbitrary terms. For instance, 
the similar characteristics are displayed by tenant 
organizations on the neighborhood, city, or state or national 
scale. If these characteristics are standardized (i.e. 
compared to scale with ATUH), then the case studies can be 
effectively compared. 
A Clarification of Terms 
A large number of studies .have documented the importance 
of the role that public participation and neighborhood 
cohesion (e.g. Clavel, 1986; Churchman, 1987) have played in 
bringing about effective change in communities of varying 
sizes and makeup. In discussing tenant cohesion in the case 
of University Heights, however, it is important to begin by 
clarifying definitions. 
The terms "neighborhood cohesion" and "tenant cohesion" 
will be used interchangeably, as the development replaced a 
neighborhood--Lippitt Hill--and assumed the basic functions 
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that this previous neighborhood served. These functions 
include the provision of a place to rear children, housing, a 
delivery point for a variety of administrative and political 
services, an economic base, and social relationships (Wireman, 
1984) . The entire development, therefore, is considered a 
"neighborhood" because of its uniqueness from surrounding 
neighborhoods. Tucked between the Mount Hope neighborhood to 
the north, Hope High School to the east, College Hill to the 
south, and Randall Square to the west, University Heights is 
largely insular in design and location. The placement of its 
buildings form pleasant green courtyards that are conducive to 
interaction. This, combined with such physical boundaries as 
the adjoining shopping center, form University Heights' 
identity as a neighborhood. 
Additional clarification is necessary in defining such 
terms as "public participation", as well as determining the 
difference between "neighborhood organization" and "community 
organization". As the actions of ATUH display many of the 
characteristics of organization described by Edelstein and 
Wandersman (1987); Churchman (1987); Gans (1962); Davies 
(1966); and Boyte (1981); each of these discuss organization 
on different scopes. For instance, Boyte, in his discussion 
of community organization during the 1970s, touches upon many 
of the same principles employed by ATUH. In the article, he 
outlines the tactics used by veteran organizer Saul Alinsky. 
These include the importance of "building indigenous 
44 
leadership'' upon pre-existing frameworks (such as ATUH's use 
of the nearby Camp Street Baptist Church, where tenant/board 
meetings are held, as a base for support) and "organizing 
people for power", which Boyte described as motivating people 
by appealing to "their own directly perceived self-interest on 
concrete issues". This is apparent in ATUH' s success in 
forming alliances "across a broad range of opinion", i.e. the 
ability to appeal to all spectrums of University Heights' 
racial, cultural, ethnic and class makeup. 
"Community organization", therefore, often takes place on 
a citywide or even regional scale, uniting people with same 
interests. "Neighborhood organization" (or, in this case, 
"tenant organization") refers to shared goals for a defined 
neighborhood and efforts to achieve those goals collectively. 
While many of the tactics and principles that apply to 
community organization also apply to organization on the 
neighborhood level, it is important to distinguish the 
potential for wider scope in community organization. 
The other principal difference between the two is the 
wider range of issues that are taken up by community 
organizations. Neighborhood organizations form in response to 
issues that have an impact on neighborhoods as geographic 
locations. ATUH, for instance, formed because of shared 
concern by University Heights tenants that their "way of life 
would be forever changed" (Platt, 1990) Therefore, such 
issues as rent increases, environmental threats (as in the 
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Edelstein and Wandersman article, which will be discussed 
later in this chapter) , and urban renewal (as in the case 
studies provided by Davies and Gans, 
all have a bonding effect which 
also to be discussed), 
facilitate neighborhood 
cohesion. Community organization, on the other hand, 
presumes a much wider scope in terms of a.) issues addressed: 
community organizations have been formed to address any issue 
from undesired development (with effects on the neighborhood 
level) to local tax rates (with effects on a wider scale); and 
b.) spatial distribution of the organization's supporters. In 
other words, location of residence may not be as important a 
consideration in the mobilizing of support for some community 
organizations. 
The last clarification necessary is the definition of 
"public participation''. This is because much of the 
literature cited in this study (e.g. Clavel, 1986) include 
discussions of public or "community participation" in terms of 
progressive governments that encourage such participation. 
Thus, while some of the principles of public or "mass" 
participation are applicable to ATUH, some degree of caution 
was necessary with the use of terminology. This caution was 
necessary for precisely the same reason the difference between 
"neighborhood" and "community organization" had to be 
clarified--a problem of scope. This is best illustrated in 
the difficulty finding appropriate literature under "public 
participation" during a literature review for this study. It 
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became apparent that an incredibly wide variety of scenarios 
were included under this heading. Such participation could 
include tenant participation, but could also include the "mass 
participation" that characterized movements of much larger 
scale. Examples of this include the cities of Hartford, 
Cleveland, and Santa Monica and their inclusion of mass 
citizen participation as public policy (Clavel, 1986). 
Centripeta1 Forces That Determine the Extent of Tenant 
Cohesion 
When a group of tenants are confronted by some form of 
threat, they do something they might not otherwise do--they 
form an alliance. As Platt will attest, "we only organized 
because we were so angry with [the previous owners of 
University Heights] " (Platt, 1990) . Al though some superficial 
signs of friendship based on proximity often exist, as 
described by Fischer (Wireman,1987), tenants or neighbors are 
often not drawn together until faced by a shared threat. 
The dynamics of this phenomenon are best illustrated by 
Edelstein and Wandersman's overview of community response to 
toxic Gontamination in the case of Legler. "As the result of 
the announcement of toxic exposure, the affected community is 
thrown into turbulence. In their attempts to cope with this 
turbulence, residents of affected areas turn naturally to key 
components of their social environments: a.) the 'social 
network' or e x isting group of friends or relatives who can 
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normally be expected to offer assistance or support in the 
face of crisis; and b.) the 'institutional network' of 
government agencies that is believed to be responsible for 
citizens in need" (1983). 
The following are elements of the framework which makes 
up Edelstein and Wandersman's study of community organization 
in Legler. These elements have been applied on a point-by-
point basis to University Heights and the formation of ATUH. 
As will be seen, some elements conform more than others. 
Overall, however, there are considerable similarities between 
the mobilization patterns of the residents of Legler and the 
tenants of University Heights. 
ENVIRONMENTAL TURBULENCE 
LEGLER RESIDENTS 
Problem Characterized By: 
1. 
Disruption of everyday life 
from anticipatory fears and 
the complexities of the 
situation. 
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PREPAYMENT OF MORTGAGES -
UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS (ATUH) 
Displacement occurs, causing 
panic among tenants. 
Unfamiliarity with 
complexities of mortgage 
payments compounds this. 
2. 
Outsiders who are expected to 
help may display contradictory 
interests and actions 
3. 
An overall scarcity of 
resources for solving the 
problem faced by the affected 
population. 
INITIAL COPING EFFORTS 
Seeking of assistance and 
support from: 
(LEGLER) 
1. 
Social Networks 
"Support from one's 
social network is commonly 
identified as essential to 
attempts to cope with a 
variety of stressful 
situations." 
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Platt's unsuccessful initial 
attempts to convince City and 
State leaders that rent 
control was necessary. Their 
response indicated a 
reluctance to interfere with 
this regard. This could be 
interpreted as a conflict of 
interest on the part of the 
Mayor and Governor, both of 
whom have close ties to real 
estate and development. 
Before the forming of ATUH's 
relationship with RILS, 
Project Basic, RIHMFC and the 
Community Builders, they had 
no financial or technical 
resources available to them. 
(ATUH) 
Tenants--especially longtime 
tenants utilized related 
networks (e.g. church) as a 
basis for their organization. 
This is illustrated by close 
ties between ATUH and the 
church. 
2. 
Institutional Networks 
People respond to 
environmental turbulence by 
seeking information and 
assistance from those having 
institutional roles commonly 
believed to give them 
e xpertise, power and 
responsibility to address the 
situation. 
COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS 
Made up of: 
(LEGLER) 
Environmental Characteristics 
Noise, density of housing, 
desirability of the area 
Ecological Characteristics 
geographic factors, size, 
boundaries 
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Ex emplified by ATUH's efforts 
to seek help from community 
organizations, lenders, and 
City and State government--
perceived as institutions that 
could provide them with the 
expertise and support 
necessary to preserve security 
of tenure at University 
Heights. 
(ATUH) 
Design features that encourage 
human interaction (e.g. common 
courtyards, high quality of 
grounds and units are all 
potential contributors to 
tenant cohesion. 
The insular design of 
University Heights (e.g. all 
units facing common 
courtyard) , isolation from 
other neighborhoods (from 
barriers such as wide roads, 
fences may also contribute to 
tenant. 
Sense of Community 
"Sarason (1974) suggested that 
the ingredients of sense of 
community are: "the perception 
of similarity to others, an 
acknowledged interdependence 
with others, a willingness to 
maintain this interdependence 
by giving to or doing for 
others what one expects from 
them, the feeling that one is 
part of a larger 
dependable and stable 
structure" (p. 157). 
Neighboring and Formal 
Organizations 
"After [the residents of 
Legler] were notified of the 
contamination, neighborhood 
communication became an 
important element in the 
residents' coping. 
51 
Interviews with Platt and 
Hebert (1991) indicated an 
interdependence between 
tenants (such as cooperation 
with regard to security at the 
development), satisfaction 
with the degree of integration 
achieved (Platt, 1990, 1991) 
and that tenure of stability 
at the development was of 
primary importance. 
As discussed earlier, 
centripetal forces, such as 
the threat of tenure security 
are an important factor in an 
organization's formation. 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
(LEGLER) 
Stone and Levine's comparison 
of activists and nonactivists 
(1985): 
"In aggregating the social 
characteristics of the 
"activists", we arrive at the 
generalization of people .with 
new roots with the community. 
They were not the old timers 
who had lived in the community 
from the beginning. They were 
also not the youngest members 
of the neighborhood, nor those 
who had lived there the least 
amount of time. They were 
"rooted" in the community, 
having lived there for several 
years, owning homes and 
employed. 
They had moderate incomes, 
and as income increased, 
so did the tendency to 
activism." 
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(ATUH) 
The situation at University 
Heights differs from Stone and 
Levine in several respects: 
Those most involved in the 
organization of tenants at 
University Heights were those 
who had lived there the 
longest and those who has live 
in the development for the 
shortest amount of time. 
Income ranges of those 
involved also differed. Some 
were working professionals, 
others were retired seniors on 
fixed incomes. There was no 
correlation between higher 
incomes and higher degrees of 
tenant activism. 
LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE 
Organizational Structure 
van Eijndhoven and Nieuwdorp's 
(1985) findings that community 
organizations varied in their 
structure from highly 
centralized and hierarchical 
to consensual decentralized 
structure. 
Eg.,Love Canal, run 
principally by a core of key 
members yet frequent broad 
participatory action 
undertaken by affected 
residents. 
Leaders and Leadership 
Eg., Legler, in which its 
Concerned Citizen's Committee 
formed around a core of 
local activists. 
Edelstein's (1982) findings 
that the majority of work 
in community organization 
in Legler was undertaken by 
a few key people, namely 
the executive board. Most 
other residents attended 
meetings, but did little 
else. 
Tenant organization at 
University Heights conformed 
to the former structure 
described by van Eijnhoven and 
Nieuwdorp. The tenant body of 
University Heights ranged from 
a small core of dedicated 
tenants to a substantial group 
who had little or no 
involvement with ATUH. 
(Adapted from: Edelstein and Wandersman, 1983) 
"Planned" Organization In Britain: Tenant Acquisition Without 
the Threat of Prepayment 
While Edelstein and Wandersman's findings indicate that 
circumstances dictate a development's potential for tenant 
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organization, an alternative is offered by Colin Ward (1974) 
in his study of tenant purchases of government-owned 
subsidized housing in Britain. 
In his argument for the transfer of municipal housing 
from local county councils to tenants, Ward (1974) claims that 
the tax structure and housing policy of Britain in the late 
1960s and early 1970s put home renters at a considerable 
disadvantage: 
"A friend of mine who bought a house less 
than 10 years ago sold it two years ago. 
With the untaxed profits he bought 
himself another house on mortgage, bought 
a new car, bought a small shop, and even 
collected rents from a flat above the 
shop. On top of that he got a better tax 
subsidy on his new mortgage. I don't 
know any council tenant who has been able 
to use his tenancy to ge t a higher 
subsidy, a new car, shop, and rent income 
from a flat" (1974). 
Ward goes on to describe a carefully contrived plan 
outlined by the tenants of Monkwick, in Essex, to purchase the 
council housing in which they live. Unlike the numerous 
examples cited previously, the tenants' response was not a 
"kneejerk" reaction to a shared threat, but a rational 
approach to what they deemed an unacceptable circumstance. 
Their story was recounted in the local paper: 
"Council tenants have made a 300 million 
pound off er to Colchester town council to 
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buy the 1000 houses on Monkwick estate. 
The Tenants' Association ... wants to 
develop the estate as a housing 
association run on community lines. 
"The tenants have worked out that the 
move would put about 30 shillings a week 
on the rents, immediately, but payments 
could be frozen at this figure for five 
years. They said that the council's fund 
would gain over 100,000 pounds per year. 
Instead of receiving a bout 128,000 pounds 
a year in rents and government subsidy, 
they would receive 234,000 pounds a year 
in mortgages on a 40-year 
contract .... Although private tenants have 
bought blocks of flats on a co-ownership 
system, nobody has ever bought an entire 
council estate" (p. 77). 
Thus, the tenants of Monkwick estate purchased their 
development to empower themselves, yet did so without the 
sense of urgency that was apparent in ATUH' s purchase of 
University Heights. While unforeseen circumstances (e.g. a 
slumping housing market) were helpful in ATUH' s success, 
tenants elsewhere may not be as fortunate. 
Monkwick, therefore, provides an example of planned 
tenant organization, of which the principal advantage is an 
acquisition process unhindered by the hasty mobilization of 
tenants upon discovering that their tenancy is threatened. 
Particularly noteworthy is the absence of Edelstein and 
Wandersman's "circumstance theorem''. This "better safe than 
sorry" attitude indicates the importance of a carefully 
planned tenant acquisition. It is one that should be 
recognized by tenants of units which are ripe for 
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prepayment. 
Although legislation (e.g. the Kennedy Bill) mandates 
reasonable notice of prepayment and priority option to buy 
reserved for tenants of units threatened by prepayment, 
Monkwick's success underscore the advantages of planned 
acquisition as opposed to the ad hoc formation of tenant 
groups brought together by circumstance. 
Tenant Functions 
As Chapter Four discussed the various responsibilities 
placed upon a tenant organization's leadership, an outline of 
the role that tenants collectively play is appropriate. 
Whatever the circumstances of their formation and whatever 
their makeup, each tenant organization consists of a body of 
residents who form an essential part of the organization. 
These roles, as identified by Edelstein and Wandersman (1987), 
are: 
1. Providers of Social Support 
2. Sources of Information 
3. Sources of Power 
These functions will be discussed in the general sense as 
well as in the context of University Heights. 
Social Support 
As Edelstein and Wandersman note of the dynamics of 
mutual tenant support: "In pulling together to address their 
common problems, [communities] not only build an organization, 
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but they build relationships as well" (1987). In this sense, 
the bond shared by those in a similar situation, i.e. the 
threat of displacement, becomes an essential means of social 
and psychological support for tenants. 
One of the more interesting points raised by this 
analysis is the conclusion that those least affected are least 
likely to become actively involved in an organization. This 
is not so in the case of ATUH, who were made up of a number of 
tenants from market rate apartments and were not affected by 
prepayment. Evidence, therefore, indicates that the social 
support provided by the tenants--particularly longtime 
residents--is strong. This conflict with Edelstein and 
Wandersman's findings only indicates that more research is 
needed to understand the networks and support structures that 
evolve from the threat of displacement. 
In summary, one of the apparent outcomes of threatened 
displacement is the development of new sources of social 
support among tenants. This occurs through a phenomenon 
described as "neighboring, which accompanies and influences 
the sense of community and participation in a grass roots 
effort to address the problem" (1987). 
Source of Information 
One of the inevitable outcomes of mutual social support 
is the sharing of information. This sharing of information 
works largely through informal networks, and subsequent rumors 
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that were generated often had to be clarified by organization 
leaders. When asked about their sources of information and 
their opinion of them during their crisis, the residents of 
Legler responded that the only source that they considered 
reliable was the organization's leadership (1987). 
This indicates that, when faced by a threat such as 
imminent displacement, tenants tend to close ranks and lend 
additional support through the provision of information. When 
the tenants of University Heights approached the development's 
previous owners after hearing rumors of prepayment, they were 
told that no such thing would occur (Platt, 1991). When 48 
units were prepaid and it was apparent that the owners did 
intend to prepay on the remainder of the subsidized units, the 
beginnings of an elaborate information network were 
established. 
Source of Power 
As noted by Edelstein and Wandersman: "The development of 
community organizations tends to provide for a new sense of 
power in the midst of a situation where there is an overall 
sense of loss of control" (1987). This sense of power, they 
argue, is apparent at two levels; community power and 
individual power. 
Community power is described as the collective ability to 
coordinate such essentials as technical support. In other 
words, by creating a context for social support, a source of 
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Individual power is apparent from the numerous growth 
outcomes that are associated with activism (1987). The 
transition that some ATUH board members (some of whom are 
retired) made from the passive role of tenant to the active 
role of decision-maker may have been "accompanied by enhanced 
self-worth and personal efficacy" (1987)--a positive 
occurrence. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although Harry Platt refers to himself and the other 
members of ATUH as "ordinary people", it is apparent that they 
are far from ordinary. Besides their display of unique and 
admirable personal attributes, this is primarily because of 
the ownership and management structure of the development in 
which they live. For a number of sociological, political, and 
economic reasons, an incredibly small proportion of Americans 
live in homes under social ownership. 
One of these reasons is the tradition of the "American 
Dream", an anachronism carried down in popular culture from a 
time of economic growth and seemingly unlimited resources. 
Unfortunately, the American Dream is now an unattainable one 
for many. One of the results of this is the innovative 
nonprofit sector that has emerged to lend support to lower 
income groups who cannot fend for themselves in the depressed 
economy of the 1990s. 
University Heights provides an illustration of some of 
the non-traditional alternatives (communally-owned housing 
such as cooperative housing and mutual housing associations) 
that are being considered. ATUH' s reasons for acquiring 
University Heights underscore the benefits of socially-owned 
housing, which provides the privacy and security of in di victual 
ownership for a more affordable price. 
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While it is impossible to determine the direct 
applicability of ATUH's achievement to the thousands of other 
subsidized developments throughout the country, a number of 
characteristics emerged which highlight some of the steps 
necessary in achieving social ownership. These will be 
outlined and summarized in this chapter. 
Goals Addressed by the Study 
While the threat of prepayment seems unlikely under 
current economic conditions, this issue must be addressed to 
prepare tenants of subsidized rental housing for the next real 
estate boom. This chapter will address the goals that were 
laid out in the Introduction and discuss them in the context 
of University Heights and the achievements of ATUH, the wider 
scope of subsidized rental housing mortgage prepayment, and 
the functions and conditions that were provided by Wireman 
(1984) and Edelstein and Wandersman (1987). 
1. The identification of the major elements behind the 
successful formation ·of a tenant organization (or 
community-based organization) who have won the right to 
home ownership and the privileges that come with it. 
This goal was addressed by the provision of the tenant 
and leadership functions that were outlined in Chapters Four 
and Five. Wireman's conditions, combined with Edelstein and 
Wandersman' s tenant functions highlight the principal elements 
necessary in attaining social ownership. Wireman's conditions 
served as the framework in describing the critical element in 
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ATUH's success--strong leadership. Based on numerous 
interviews, extensive research of ATUH' s methods, and analysis 
of relevant literature, it is apparent that, of the two 
principal elements of tenant organization discussed in this 
study, leadership is more essential. 
The detailed anal ys is of these elements provided in 
Chapters Four and Five indicate that the principal reason why 
leadership plays a more active role is largely because the 
conditions or functi ons are served most adequately by a small 
core of active tenants as opposed to a mass of tenants with 
varying degrees of involvement or interest. It may even be 
stated with a considerable degree of confidence that key 
individuals have more influence on an organization's success 
than the degree of cohesion displayed or functions served 
collectively by a tenant organization. 
This is absolutely the case with ATUH, which paralleled 
van Eijndhoven and Niewdorp' s findings in that ATUH acted 
essentially without frequent corrununication with a large 
proportion of University Heights tenants. Many members-at-
large simply paid their dues but wished to remain anonymous 
for fear of eviction during ATUH's conflict with the 
development's previous owners. Furthermore, even among those 
most active in the acquisition process, Harry Platt appears to 
have played a central role. An overview of some of these 
leadership conditions will underscore their greater 
significance relative to tenant functions. 
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With regard to the first condition, the provision ot: 
information on an ongoing basis, it is clear that, without 
some form of hierarchy or chain of command, the organization's 
direction and motivation may be seriously hindered. Whatever 
its size, a CBO must have a reference point by which to 
determine its directi o n and clarify its goals and objectives. 
These functions are all served by leaders and have no 
significant degree of dependence on the mass of tenants that 
comprise the organization. 
The second condition, the availability of trusted 
technical assistance in understanding complicated or technical 
programs, also highlights the relative importance of 
leadership. In this case, the key lies in the representation 
that is necessary for effective communication between the CBO 
and those providing their technical assistance. 
This is also the case with leadership's regular meetings 
with decision makers during their deliberations, the third 
condition discussed by Wireman. Representation--provided by 
the CBO' s leadership--is again the key element. As the 
support of political leaders is of the utmost importance in 
the complex negotiations involved, the syndrome of "too many 
Chiefs and no Indians" described by Gans (1962), must be 
avoided. 
Leadership's importance relative to cohesion displayed t 
tenants is again raised when the organization is faced wi 
the task of proving to both city officials and neighborh 
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residents that the organization is representative of the area, 
the fourth condition. In the case of University Heights, this 
was achieved by a display of unity among residents of market 
rate and subsidized units alike. ATUH recognized that only by 
creating an association serving the best interests of all 
tenants were they to be viewed as legitimate in the eyes of 
political leaders, lenders and other key allies. It would be 
considerably more difficult for a less organized group to take 
these factors into consideration and have the self-perception 
to address them. 
Finally, the provision of sufficient ongoing stable 
financial support to relieve a group from spending most of its 
energies on fund raising, again raises the importance of the 
coordination provided by tenant leadership. Examples of this 
are provided by ATUH, who organized the collection of token 
$10 membership fees and solicited the assistance of RILS, 
Project Basic and The Community Builders. 
What is most significant about each of these conditions 
is their illustration of leadership's importance relative to 
a mere cohesion. The lesson provided by University Heights 
and ATUH is primarily that a small group of tenants with 
coordination and focus will achieve more than a large group 
without these attributes. In other words, an organization's 
size is of secondary importance to the qualities inherent in 
its leadership. 
The dismal failure of West End tenants to organize 
64 
effectively, as described by Gans, provides an important 
lesson to tenant organizations. If no leadership qualities 
(such as communication and organization skills) are displayed 
among tenants interested in acquisition, they may face 
considerable obstacles. This is not to say, however, that 
Edelstein and Wandersman' s tenant functions are not important. 
There role is simply secondary. They supplement leadership, 
providing support to the organization as a whole, but are by 
no means indispensable. 
This is exemplified by the principles by which Saul 
Alinsky worked in establishing tenant organizations. His 
strategy presupposed leadership as the CBO's basis and 
advocated "organizing himself out of a job" (Boyte, 1981). 
All relevant case studies (including Gans, Edelstein and 
Wandersman, Clavel, and Wireman), therefore, indicate that the 
hierarchical structure which characterized ATUH is the most 
effective form of organization~ The key to the Association's 
success--the financing necessary to purchase the development--
sums up what is really essential and what is superfluous in 
this regard. RIHMFC did not provide ATUH with financing 
because the Association was large. The abilities and 
determination of ATUH board members proved to be the most 
influential factors in their successful acquisition. 
Two major elements behind a successful tenant 
organization in the case of subsidized rental housing 
threatened by prepayment can therefore be identified as: 
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an individual or group, with the necessary personal 
attributes (somewhat extroverted, with strong 
communication and organizational skills) who will 
take on a leadership role; and 
circumstances that call for an immediate and drastic 
response to a threat to the status quo currently 
enjoyed by tenants. 
The second element is obviously disputable. Social 
ownership does, in fact, take place without the prepayment of 
221 (d) (3) mortgages or the expiration of Section 8 housing 
vouchers. However, it can be assumed with reasonable 
confidence that, unless tenants are directly threatened by 
prepayment, they will not mobilize. Even laws that have been 
devised to protect tenants of subsidized rental housing from 
displacement caused by mortgage prepayments (such as the 
Kennedy Bill) are a reactive response. 
While alternative methods of home ownership are slowly 
gaining acceptance, the tenants of several hundred thousand 
subsidized units whose mortgages could be prepaid will more 
than likely not respond until they face imminent displacement. 
This was certainly the case .at University Heights. As Platt 
indicated, it was anger and resentment toward the previous 
owners of University Heights that sparked ATUH's actions. 
2. The utilization of identified elements (i.e. leadership 
and cohesion) as variables by which to evaluate the 
emergence, development, and eventual success of ATUH. 
With specific regard to University Heights, the 
previously- described elements vary in their applicability. 
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While ATUH closely parallels the hierarchic structure 
characteristic of Love Canal residents described by Edelstein 
and Wandersman, very few characteristics of "public 
participation" o r "community organization" as discussed by 
Clavel and Wireman are apparent. It can be concluded, 
therefore, that ATUH conformed closely with regard to the 
first element--leadership, but very few similarities can be 
drawn between the case study and tenant cohesion. In sum, it 
can be derived that the former can flourish without the 
latter, but the reverse is unlikely. 
Keeping in mind the scope of the study--those elements 
directly influenced and controlled by tenants themselves--the 
emergence, development and eventual success of ATUH can be 
solely attributed to leadership. Because of the passive 
participation of many ATUH members-at-large, tenant cohesion 
as a collective force had little or nothing to do with the 
Association's success. 
3. The drawing of conclusions as to what lessons can be 
learned from ATUB's success and how this success can be 
simulated in other identified developments throughout 
Rhode Island. 
One of the principal lessons to be derived from the case 
is study is preparation. While it doesn't appear likely that 
real estate speculation will claim any more subsidized units 
for the time being, tenants should certainly be aware of the 
implications of prepayment and how they can respond. 
In additi on, tenants should be aware of what legal 
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recourse is available to them. Although ATUH did not follow 
through with their lawsuit, a new source of tenancy protection 
was identified. Besides protection from Title VIII of the 
Fair Housing Act of 1968, as discuss e d in Chapter Two, the 
Kennedy Bill also provides protection in that it gives tenants 
of subsidized rental housing first priority at the purchase of 
the development if it is offered up for sale. 
Several additional lessons are worth noting, as provided 
by ATUH President Harry Platt. 
"First, that a group of tenants with drive determination, 
and organization can succeed, against great odds, in gaining 
control of their own housing. 
Second, important and timely assistance provided by 
dedicated nonprofit agencies and organizations is available to 
tenant groups who wish to take on the challenge of gaining 
control of their own housing. 
Finally, and most important, any group of tenants who 
work hard and stick together can achieve these same results" 
{Platt, 1990). 
4. The identification of steps useful to potential tenant 
organizations based on analysis of elements and 
subsequent conclusions. 
First, tenants should evaluate the stability of their tenancy. 
By looking at the indicators which would determine the degree of 
risk to which a deve l opment is exposed, some basic conclusions can 
be drawn. 
Second, tenants should decide whether ownership is worth 
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pursuing even if their development is not threatened. The benefits 
of social ownership e x ist whether displacement is imminent or not. 
Third, potential candidates for tenant organization leadership 
should be reviewed. If no one among the tenant body will commit 
themselves, acquisition is unlikely. 
Finally, technical support should be actively sought. Several 
key areas must be addressed. These include real estate and 
development assistance, legal assistance and community organization 
assistance. As Platt noted, these forms of assistance are 
available, but must be sought. 
In conclusion, it should be noted that ATUH' s purchase of 
University Heights does not mean they lived "happily ever after". 
In their first meeting since ATUH's purchase of University Heights, 
Harry Platt noted that ATUH's ownership had presented a whole new 
set of problems. Platt refers to these problems, however, as 
"challenges''. Despite frequent phone calls at odd hours and the 
newly acquired task of working out democratic agreements on which 
cable channels University Heights will receive, Platt and other 
ATUH members are proud of their achievement and all agree that the 
benefits of social ownership outweigh the sense of helplessness 
that characterized the previous phase of their tenancy at 
University Heights. By their purchase, ATUH were able to prove 
that the American Dream is still attainable, only in a form more 
adaptive to minimal government intervention and economic 
instability. 
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